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Introduction 
 
 
Africa – G20 and Proposals for 
Marshall Plans 
New Instruments for New External Economic Settings? 
Evita Schmieg 
Africa ranks high on Europe’s – and especially Germany’s – political agenda for 2017. 
The broader framework of relations is in flux, with the United States’ economic policies 
turning inward, China’s economic growth tailing off, and a number of economic part-
nership agreements between the EU and African regions coming into force. Africa is a 
priority of the German G20 Presidency, but there are also discussions about ideas for 
a Marshall Plan proposed by the German Minister for Economic Cooperation and the 
President of the European Parliament respectively. These initiatives open up opportuni-
ties for Germany and Europe to evolve the foundations of cooperation with Africa. 
 
The debates stirred by the refugee crisis 
have a welcome side-effect for Africa, with 
the urgent issue of sustainable develop-
ment finally being addressed at all political 
levels under the banner of “addressing the 
root causes”. And with progress observed in 
a number of countries, business interest is 
growing too. This has generated discussion 
about potentials to strengthen trade and 
investment flows between Europe and 
African countries. In fact, Europe’s relative 
importance for Africa’s economies has 
declined over the past two decades: while 
Europe supplied about 40 percent of Sub-
Saharan Africa’s imports in 1995, the figure 
had fallen to 24 percent by 2015. China 
on the other hand, has gone from having 
almost no trade with Africa in the mid-
1990s to supplying 21 percent of its 
imported goods in 2015. 
An Increasingly Attractive Economic 
Proposition 
A number of African countries – including 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda – have 
achieved annual growth rates exceeding 
5 percent in recent years. Less well-endowed 
with natural resources, they have instead 
improved internal conditions. This is re-
flected in the World Bank’s Doing Business 
Index, where five African countries were 
among the ten most improved in 2013/14. 
With its rapidly growing population – 
set to double to 2.5 billion by 2050 – Africa 
needs to create about 30 million new jobs 
annually. This also offers opportunities, 
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especially in light of demographic ageing in 
the developed world, with the emergence of 
a consumerist middle class making Africa 
an increasingly attractive market. 
Foreign direct investment inflows (FDI) 
in Africa have surged in recent years, even 
if the continent’s global cumulative share 
in investment stocks is still tiny at 3 per-
cent. Today significant investments flow to 
countries outside the established trio of 
South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya, too, while 
China, India and African countries have 
emerged as increasingly important sources 
of FDI. Although Chinese investments are 
welcomed with open arms as a route to 
infrastructure expansion, they also attract 
criticism for the declining share of grants 
and for partly bypassing domestic labour 
standards through some African-Chinese 
investment agreements. Moreover, about 
60 percent of jobs created by Chinese 
investments in Africa are filled by Chinese 
workers so the employment effect is far 
smaller than expected. 
Developments in 2017 
Continental Free Trade Area 
The African Union hopes to launch a Con-
tinental Free Trade Area (CFTA) in 2017. 
That does not, however, mean the end of 
tariff barriers for all intra-African trade 
flows, because the CFTA will be a long-term 
endeavour. For the moment, agreement on 
the structure of further talks is what appears 
possible. Such an agreement would itself 
have no effect on trade flows, but it would 
permit topics and negotiating mechanisms 
to be defined moving towards a CFTA. 
African representatives of business, govern-
ments and NGOs expect the negotiations 
to produce some initial results in very 
closely defined areas, in order to underline 
the project’s political significance. 
Global trade deals in limbo 
Africa played no part in the two major 
regional agreements that have now been 
put on ice, the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the 
European Union and the United States. 
Conceived in part as geopolitical interven-
tions, these projects possessed potential to 
cause trade diversion and further strength-
en the United States’ position as a trade 
and investment hub. So for the moment 
uninvolved third countries are spared such 
potentially harmful effects. But no signifi-
cant substantive progress can be expected 
from the WTO’s next Ministerial Confer-
ence in December 2017 either. Smaller 
countries are especially reliant on fair rules 
in a functioning multilateral system. 
New framework for trade with the EU 
A number of economic partnership 
agreements (EPAs) between the EU and 
African regions have already come into 
force on a provisional basis, for example 
with the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and since 2012 with 
Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA). The 
situation in other regions is patchy: 
Tanzania refuses to sign the EPA with the 
East African Community (EAC), so the next 
EAC summit will have to decide how to 
proceed; in the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) bilateral 
interim agreements are in place with Ghana 
and Côte d’Ivoire. One fundamental diffi-
culty is that all the African regions include 
least developed countries, which already 
enjoy free access to the EU market (i.e. 
without EPAs). In fact, however, LDCs have 
their own good grounds to participate in 
EPAs – in addition to their regional integra-
tion objectives not least to secure permanent 
free access to the EU market. Tanzania for 
instance could join the group of middle-
income countries in 2020 if its present rate 
of growth continues, thus losing its LDC 
status and free market access. 
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The German G20 Presidency 
Almost all the priorities Germany has 
defined for its G20 Presidency affect Africa 
indirectly. There is also specific discussion 
about a “Compact with Africa”, and it is 
likely that the G20 will support reform 
packages for African countries in this con-
text. Such approaches are nothing new in 
development policy. For example, inter-
national donors discuss sectoral budgets 
with African partner governments under 
the label “budget support”, and provide 
financial support if these contain adequate 
provisions for reforms. Although politicians 
from conservative political parties in Eu-
rope in particular have tended to reject this 
instrument, the experience with budget aid 
and reform partnerships is worth drawing 
on. The WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agree-
ment also foresees development funding 
to support reform steps. In the G20 frame-
work it would be especially interesting to 
identify and conclude agreements in areas 
where reforms on both sides are involved, 
and where instruments beyond those of 
classical development policy come into 
play. This would underline the G20’s desire 
to conduct a dialogue with African partners 
rather than just talking among themselves 
about Africa. For example the G20 could 
offer to refrain from exporting chicken cuts 
to particular African countries, if they in 
return introduced reforms to support and 
develop local poultry production (see SWP 
Comments 57/2016). While this sector 
might appear marginal from the European 
perspective, it plays an important role in 
many African countries, both economically 
and politically. The G20 offers a suitable 
framework for such an agreement, as it 
includes all the biggest poultry exporters. 
Marshall Plans 
The German Minister for Economic Cooper-
ation, Gerd Müller, proposes a Marshall 
Plan with Africa. Rather than financial 
transfers, the objective is reform to pro-
mote African development and opportuni-
ties for the private sector in Africa. His 
initiative does not at present have the 
status of a German government plan of 
action. The plan lays out a broad vision for 
future cooperation but is very disparate, 
naming no priorities and paying little heed 
to existing instruments and discussions. On 
trade policy for example, it is not concrete 
about how to further develop trade agree-
ments. Under investments the instruments 
of the European Investment Bank and the 
World Bank are mentioned only in passing. 
Some of the proposals certainly appear 
unrealistic, and incapable of passing inter-
ministerial discussions. This applies for 
example to the idea of tax breaks in the 
scope of a development aid act, which is 
also rejected by the business organisations 
for contravening the principles of trans-
parent fiscal policy. On the other hand, 
expanding guarantee instruments to pro-
mote trade and investment by German 
firms is of interest to German business – 
but this does not necessarily relate to devel-
opment instruments. Operationalising the 
Marshall Plan will therefore require intense 
discussion and coordination – for which 
scope will be limited until after the 2017 
Bundestag election. Reform partnerships 
are the proposal with the best prospects of 
realisation, as a similar programme is 
already included in Berlin’s programme 
for the German G20 Presidency. 
The idea of a Marshall Plan for Africa 
floated by Antonio Tajani, President of the 
European Parliament has yet to be specified 
in detail. What Tajani appears to have in 
mind is a multi-billion investment pro-
gramme. Alongside private-sector invest-
ments, he places great weight on state 
investment in education and agriculture. 
Conclusions 
Over and above minor development pro-
jects, what the G20’s discussion about 
Africa and Marshall Plans could achieve 
would be an exploration of new options for 
future cooperation with Africa and a review 
of the suitability of existing instruments. 
Germany should investigate the opportuni-
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ties opened up by changing circumstances 
for new coalitions on various issues and 
examine the extent to which new instru-
ments are required. Closer cooperation 
with China in Africa would be conceivable, 
for example on questions of climate change 
and infrastructure. The G20 offers a con-
ducive setting for these discussions. 
It is also right to discuss the role of the 
private sector for African development 
and take a closer look at German engage-
ment. Because of the central role played 
by medium-sized businesses, the German 
private sector is especially reliant on a 
secure environment for its investments. 
“Classical” development policy already con-
tributes to improvements here. If there 
are moves to incentivise German business 
engagement in Africa, it will be important 
to avoid harmful side-effects such as free-
riding effects or the displacement of private 
investment by state support. But the discus-
sion must not concentrate exclusively on 
the needs of the private sector. Although 
the latter will have to supply the bulk of 
investment and create the jobs Africa needs, 
this can only succeed if African govern-
ments create a productive environment 
through their policies and investments, 
for example in areas like education, health 
and infrastructure. 
The economic partnership agreements 
with Africa put an end to the non-recipro-
cal trade preferences through which the 
European Union favoured former colonies 
and disadvantaged other developing coun-
tries. Accompaniment of EPA implementa-
tion is foreseen, to ensure that the oppor-
tunities are grasped and risks – for example 
for local production – avoided. But the 
African regions themselves must ensure 
that the future trade preferences they will 
grant to Europe under these agreements – 
however small they be – are not detri-
mental to their African trade partners. To 
that extent the EPAs represent an incentive 
to speed up the dismantling of trade bar-
riers between African countries. African 
governments are therefore well advised to 
take seriously their declared goals of closer 
economic integration within regional com-
munities such as ECOWAS and the EAC, 
and to implement decisions already made. 
In other words, the EPAs can be a step on 
the road to the CFTA, and an incentive to 
move more quickly. 
As yet the African partnership agreements 
are restricted to liberalisation of trade in 
goods, and contain no provisions for dia-
logue formats between the EU and the 
Africa regions on sectoral questions such 
as investment or competition policy. Afri-
can countries should grasp the opportunity 
offered by planned talks on wider issues to 
incentivise their own reform agenda. The 
example of the Caribbean EPA illustrates 
how this can successfully go beyond ques-
tions of market opening. 
 
 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2017 
All rights reserved 
These Comments reflect  
the author’s views. 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 
International and  
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
Translation by Meredith Dale 
(English version of 
SWP-Aktuell 18/2017) 
